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The international community’s efforts to help resolve 
the Kashmir issue began only weeks after the dispute 
erupted in October 1947. The controversy remained 
on the world’s radar scope for a quarter of a century, 
then faded away when India and Pakistan agreed at 
Simla in 1972 to resolve it peacefully by bilateral 
negotiations. The outbreak of an insurrection against 
Indian rule in the Kashmir Valley at the end of 1989 
returned the problem to world attention. The United 
States and other major powers soon recognized that 
the nuclear capabilities of the rival claimants made 
the issue more dangerous and its resolution more 
urgent. But Washington’s main initiatives in recent 
years have focused on managing the India-Pakistan 
crises Kashmir has sparked, not on the elusive search 
for resolution of the Kashmir dispute itself. It has 
urged both countries to reach a mutually acceptable 
settlement that takes into account the wishes of the 
Kashmiri people, and has declared its willingness to 
play a facilitating role in helping the parties resolve 
the issue if both the Indians and Pakistanis wish it to. 
Other interested powers have been even less involved. 
All have recognized that the continuing refusal of the 
Indian government to countenance an international 
role in Kashmir makes it likely that any outside 
efforts will be as unsuccessful as others were in the 
past. 
This conventional—and till now sensible—
approach may not necessarily remain valid. In this 
article, I will argue that recent important develop-
ments may—just may—offer opportunities for the 
world community led by the United States to play 
a useful part in resolving this seemingly intractable 
problem.
Failure at the United Nations
The international community’s involvement in the 
Kashmir dispute is a history of repeated frustration 
and failure. Ironically, in light of India’s later nega-
tive attitude toward “internationalizing” the issue, 
it was New Delhi that first brought Kashmir before 
the United Nations in January 1948, a few weeks 
after a series of events in the state that the claimants 
interpret in wildly different ways triggered a dispute 
still with us sixty years later.  
The United States and Britain quickly took the 
lead in the Security Council’s efforts to resolve the 
issue. In the Truman administration’s view, the 
dispute seemed tailor-made for the fledgling organi-
zation’s role as a crisis-manager and problem-solver. 
Initially, Washington tended to defer to London as 
the leader of the Commonwealth and the subconti-
nent’s recent imperial master. Other nations played 
lesser, supporting roles, generally backing U.S.-British 
initiatives and providing experienced diplomats for 
a succession of special missions. In the earliest stages 
the Soviet Union generally stood aloof, though it 
increasingly came to favor the Indian position. 
Much of the early action focused on the activities 
of the five-member United Nations Commission for 
India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The commission even-
tually adopted resolutions calling for a ceasefire, with-
drawal of forces, and an internationally-supervised 
plebiscite in which the Kashmiri people would decide 
whether to join India or Pakistan. A third option, 
independence, was excluded. Aside from the ceasefire, 
the UNCIP resolutions were never implemented. 
Indian stonewalling was principally to blame: despite 
its official position, New Delhi did not want a plebi-
scite and was satisfied with the status quo, which gave 
it the key Kashmir Valley. A series of high-level mis-
sions under UN auspices were similarly unproductive 
in bringing about a settlement. The UN was able to 
set up a military observers’ group stationed along the 
ceasefire line. The contingent played a helpful role in 
calming the situation along the line, at least until the 
second India-Pakistan War in 1965.
The Eisenhower administration’s 1954 decision to 
enlist Pakistan in the Western security alliance system 
effectively ended any lingering hope that U.S.-led 
efforts at the UN could produce a Kashmir settle-
ment. In Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s view, 
the Cold War had come to the subcontinent. The 
Soviet decision to fully endorse India’s position on 
Kashmir made it certain that Moscow would veto any 
proposed UN Kashmir resolution not acceptable to 
New Delhi. If Washington kept on promoting a role 
for the UN, it was only to keep its new ally Pakistan 
reasonably happy, not because it believed that any 
progress could be made. Other countries recognized 
the impossibility of resolving the dispute and stayed 
aloof.
Efforts by Major Powers
America, Britain, and the Soviet Union also made 
efforts outside the United Nations to resolve or 
contain the dispute. Two U.S. presidents became 
personally engaged. In the late 1950s, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower weighed in to promote U.S. supervised 
India-Pakistan negotiations on a basket of crucial 
issues including Kashmir. The Indians rejected 
this intervention. Eisenhower’s successor, John 
F. Kennedy, concluded that India’s defeat by the 
Chinese in the 1962 border war put a settlement 
within reach. The failure of Indian and Pakistani 
negotiators to make any progress in six rounds of 
discussion in which the United States and Britain 
became increasingly involved proved him wrong. 
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Moscow’s turn came in 1966, when Alexei 
Kosygin, the Soviet premier, engineered an agreement 
at Tashkent that ended the second India-Pakistan 
War. But that pact merely restored the status quo ante 
bellum. It did not come to grips with the underlying 
issue of Kashmir’s political future that had triggered 
the war.
Later International Efforts
The Tashkent conference was the last serious involve-
ment by outside powers in the Kashmir issue until 
it exploded again onto the world stage at the end of 
1989. In the following eighteen years, the United 
States again took the lead in international efforts to 
deal with the dispute and, more specifically, with a 
series of India-Pakistan crises the issue generated. 
President Bill Clinton’s personal role in 1999 in 
persuading Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw 
Pakistani forces from the Kargil area of Indian-
administered Kashmir was only the most dramatic 
of several high-level U.S. interventions. But neither 
America nor any other country did much more than 
urge the two claimants to reach a settlement bilater-
ally. The most significant international call, orches-
trated by Washington, came following the 1998 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests, when the 
Security Council and the Group of Eight urged New 
Delhi and Islamabad to return to the negotiating 
table. But as noted, the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations maintained that they were prepared 
to play a more active “facilitating” role only if India 
and Pakistan wanted them to. No other countries 
went even that far. 
New Delhi continued to resist internationalizing 
the issue and rejected Washington’s offers. India 
had long since recognized that its bringing Kashmir 
before the United Nations in 1948 was a blunder and 
concluded that as the militarily stronger status quo 
power it was in its interest to deal with the dispute 
bilaterally if at all. By the same token, Pakistan has 
believed at least since 1965 that only international 
intervention could change the political geography of 
the state—though it has at times stirred up trouble in 
Kashmir in the hope that this would lead the world 
to take the action it desired. But neither government 
has yet taken into full account the impact the nuclear 
tests have had on international consideration of the 
dispute. These explosions led the world community 
to focus on maintaining the stability of the subcon-
tinent and lessened the importance it attached to the 
equities of the Kashmir issue. For the United States 
and other countries, the use of violence to change 
the status quo had become an unacceptable option in 
nuclear-armed South Asia. This attitude gave the Line 
of Control a “sanctity” it had not enjoyed before, to 
India’s advantage.
Fresh Possibilities for an International Role
Against this discouraging six-decade background, 
what role can the United States and other countries 
play beyond cheering the two sides on from the side-
lines and helping defuse crises? Several developments 
have occurred in recent years that seem to argue for 
a more active international approach. Washington 
would need to take the lead in any such initiative. 
Other countries could help. Moscow could use its 
influence in New Delhi to persuade the Indians to 
be more forthcoming. Beijing could be helpful in 
Islamabad. Pakistan still views China as its most 
reliable friend among the major powers even though 
the Chinese no longer endorse the Pakistani position 
on Kashmir and urge, as the United States does, 
that India and Pakistan settle the dispute bilaterally. 
The European Union led by Britain should also be 
enlisted, and some Muslim countries might have 
some weight with the Pakistanis. The smaller South 
Asian nations should not be counted on. Anxious not 
to offend either India or Pakistan, they have taken 
advantage of the “no-bilateral dispute” provision of 
the rules of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) and have consistently kept 
their heads down on Kashmir. They will continue to 
do so. In short, it is only the United States that has 
the combination of political clout and diplomatic and 
economic resources to undertake the heavy lifting 
needed to persuade India and Pakistan to cross the 
elusive finish line and agree to a settlement.
Why should Washington undertake such a thank-
less task? I would cite four considerations: 
1. The United States and India have dramatically 
strengthened their relations and developed a serious 
strategic partnership. This may lessen India’s 
long-standing, knee-jerk opposition to any role 
for Washington in the Kashmir issue. It may also 
help New Delhi to recognize, as it should have 
since the Kargil crisis in 1999, that greater U.S. 
involvement could actually be beneficial from its 
viewpoint. The improvement in U.S.-India rela-
tions has not come at the expense of American ties 
with Pakistan, which remain strong. 
2.  India’s ambition to play a major role on the interna-
tional stage has heightened. In the past, the unre-
solved Kashmir issue has detracted from India’s 
image and lessened its prospects for major power 
status and the permanent seat on an expanded 
UN Security Council that Indians believe should 
go with it. Now that India’s breakneck economic 
growth has made its gaining a place at the inter-
national high table a more achievable goal, it may 
see Kashmir as an obstacle to the recognition it 
seeks and be more prepared to rid itself of this 
“albatross.”  
 The Soviet decision to 
fully endorse India’s position 
on Kashmir made it certain 
that Moscow would veto 
any proposed UN Kashmir 
resolution not acceptable to 
New Delhi.
 The Tashkent conference 
in 1966 was the last serious 
involvement by outside 
powers in the Kashmir issue 
until it exploded again onto 
the world stage at the end 
of 1989. 
 Neither India nor 
Pakistan has yet taken into 
full account the impact the 
nuclear tests have had on 
international consideration 
of the Kashmir dispute.
17
3.  A Kashmir settlement has become even more impor-
tant to American interests in South Asia and beyond. 
As noted, Washington has feared that another 
conflict between the two over Kashmir could 
escalate into a nuclear war ever since India and 
Pakistan acquired the capacity to develop nuclear 
weapons in the 1990s. Following 9/11, the critical 
role of Pakistan in shaping the future of Afghani-
stan and otherwise contributing to the global 
war against terrorism has given the dispute even 
more dangerous dimensions in the U.S. view. The 
continuing patronage Pakistani intelligence agen-
cies provide Islamic extremists in Kashmir makes 
it more difficult both politically and militarily for 
Islamabad to help the United States and its coali-
tion partners combat these forces on the Afghan 
frontier and elsewhere in Pakistan. Continued 
Pakistan-supported armed Islamic extremism in 
Kashmir also has an adverse impact on Pakistani 
political stability, another major U.S. interest.
4. India’s and Pakistan’s positions on the terms of a 
settlement have grown closer. The two sides have 
been discussing Kashmir in formal dialogue and 
through a regular back-channel for more than 
three years. Though the exchanges have resulted 
in only limited progress, both governments have 
been willing to continue them. They have also 
adopted useful confidence-building measures 
such as the opening of the Line of Control to the 
movement of people and goods. Their present 
determination to carry on despite disappoint-
ments, particularly for the Pakistanis, sharply 
contrasts to the long spells when New Delhi 
and Islamabad could find no basis for discussing 
Kashmir and other India-Pakistan problems.
In the process, both countries, but especially 
Pakistan, have floated ideas that bring their positions 
closer together on several key issues. President Pervez 
Musharraf ’s publicly stated willingness to give up 
Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite and his conditional 
acceptance of the Line of Control as the permanent 
India-Pakistan border in Kashmir are historic events. 
The government of Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh, for its part, has gone farther than its predeces-
sors in welcoming and initiating confidence build-
ing measures concerning Kashmir as well as other 
aspects of India-Pakistan relations. Like Musharraf, 
Singh says he wants to make the Line of Control 
“irrelevant.” There has been useful but inconclusive 
discussion on both sides about establishing joint 
institutions or mechanisms that would operate 
throughout the state and deal with a range of non-
controversial matters in which Kashmiris on both 
sides of the line share an interest. Tourism, forestry, 
and hydrology are some possible subjects. There has 
also been some talk of setting up a joint legislative 
consultative body. So far those who favor such coop-
erative arrangements have not defined the powers and 
responsibilities of the proposed bodies.
Caveats
Despite this progress, important gaps remain. India’s 
informal response to Musharraf ’s call for greater 
self-governance for Kashmiris has been to equate it 
with the powers all Indian states enjoy. In addition, 
any serious discussion on this issue between New 
Delhi and “its” Kashmiris will be complicated by the 
unwillingness of the hindu majority in Jammu and 
the Buddhist majority in Ladakh to accept political 
arrangements they fear would subjugate them to the 
Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. 
The two sides remain at an impasse on disarma-
ment. The Indians insist that they can only reduce or 
redeploy their armed forces in the state if Pakistan-
sponsored insurgent activities cease or are sharply 
rolled back. Both tend to speak of disarmament as if 
it were a self-defining term, whereas in fact in would 
have to be defined in negotiations. 
Moreover, the degree to which other Pakistanis 
accept Musharraf ’s proposals or can be persuaded 
to do so is unclear. The president’s “out-of-the-box” 
ideas drew significant opposition when he first raised 
them, though it soon died down. The ideas seem 
likely to arouse even stronger protest should they 
become Pakistan’s formal position. Nor is it certain 
that a successor civilian or military regime would 
accept them. 
But although the prospects of a Kashmir 
settlement have risen and the importance of such 
a resolution is now greater for American interests 
than before, political pressures in Washington and 
Islamabad make such a role inadvisable at this point. 
For the United States to play a more active part will 
require both policy space and time. The lame-duck 
Bush administration, overstretched by Iraq and other 
foreign policy problems more immediately pressing 
than Kashmir, has neither. The Pakistani and Indian 
governments also need to feel secure enough to take 
the political risks inevitable in a settlement. Fight-
ing for his political life, Musharraf cannot take on 
this added challenge. And India, which as the status 
quo power has never been in a hurry to resolve the 
dispute, is not likely to view a weakened Musharraf 
or a fledgling insecure civilian or military successor as 
reliable negotiating partners.
So until more propitious circumstances arise in 
Washington, Islamabad, and New Delhi, the United 
States should maintain its present policy of watchful 
waiting. 
Bases for a Settlement
The new U.S. administration that takes office in 
2009, however, should look for opportunities to 
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play a more active part. Should it undertake such an 
intervention, its efforts should be designed to help 
the parties reach a settlement that will include several 
key elements: 
•	 The Line of Control, or something geographically 
close to it, will become the permanent border 
between Indian and Pakistani Kashmir. 
•	  The border will be sufficiently porous to allow for 
the easy movement of people and goods across it. 
•	  Kashmiris on both sides of the line will be 
granted a greater degree of self-government. 
•	  Joint institutions will be established on an 
all-Kashmir basis to play a role in managing non-
controversial matters affecting Kashmiris on both 
sides.
American officials should work quietly, suggest-
ing useful building blocks to the parties to help them 
achieve a settlement along these lines. They can act 
as a sounding board, advising each side of the likely 
acceptability to the other of proposals it is consider-
ing putting on the negotiating table. But Americans 
should not sit at the negotiating table—a bad idea 
and one the Indians will not accept. Keeping to an 
informal, unobtrusive role they will want to discour-
age any public discussion of their activities. As the 
negotiations are likely to be protracted, Washington 
and its diplomats in the field should accept that they 
are in it for the long haul, keep patient, and repress 
the natural American preference for swift results.
Despite its improved relations with the United 
States, India will be more wary of an outsider’s role 
than Pakistan. Washington needs to look for ways to 
persuade New Delhi to accept an agreement that does 
not meet all of India’s demands. An offer of strong 
and active U.S. backing for a permanent Indian UN 
Security Council seat could be one approach worth 
weighing. Washington might also usefully consider 
providing support to some of the proposed joint 
mechanisms in Kashmir by establishing with the 
World Bank and other potential donors a special 
fund for Kashmir reconstruction. It should also enlist 
other countries to brace its efforts while recogniz-
ing that it will have to bear the major international 
burden. Similarly, it will need to find creative ways to 
persuade the Pakistanis that a settlement that offers 
little or no change in the geographic status quo in 
Kashmir is worth their while. 
Even under improved political circumstances a 
diplomatic initiative to resolve Kashmir is far from 
a sure bet, so Washington should keep it expecta-
tions appropriately modest. If there is any lesson to 
be drawn from the events of the past six decades it is 
that the Kashmir issue is complex and difficult and 
needs to be addressed with due respect for its tortured 
history. 
By giving India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri 
people the added push they need to get them across 
the elusive finish line, Washington supported by 
others may be able to provide major help to bring 
to an acceptable conclusion a dangerous, seemingly 
intractable problem that has undermined Indian and 
Pakistani interests, played havoc with the lives of the 
Kashmiri people, caused serious political problems 
for the United States and the international commu-
nity, and made the state a potential tinder-box for 
nuclear war.
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